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3
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF WILLIAM JAMES’S
THOUGHT
David E. Leary

In late August of 1911, one year after William James’s death, the Spanish-born philosopher
George Santayana depicted the American philosophical scene with more acuity than any nativeborn philosopher could have mustered. American philosophy, he said, had consisted of a distinctive sort of Calvinism wrapped in idealistic trappings. More vital in years past, this “genteel
tradition” (as he called it) had grown stale over time. If its “hereditary spirit” was not entirely
“high-and-dry,” it was at least “becalmed” by the time of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who was “too
keen, too perceptive, and too independent” to be satisfied with its abstract character and thin
veneer. Unable to escape this tradition altogether, Emerson had taken meaningful steps toward
a new approach, enlivened by a deep love and abiding respect for Nature, which his philosophical predecessors had lacked. But it was William James, Santayana argued, who more thoroughly
“burst those bands” that had held this tradition together, liberating himself and his countrymen
from a dying heritage through his own “personal spontaneity” and “vitality.” James, Santayana
said, “had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age.” In fact, “his way
of thinking and feeling represented the true America, and . . . in a measure the whole ultramodern, radical world.” He had pointed the way forward, not only for American philosophers,
but for many others in those “parts of the world” where “his scattered words” had “caught fire”
(Santayana 2009: 527–35).
Santayana’s assessment underscored his conviction that James had placed his finger squarely
upon the pulse of America and provided an accurate measure of the spirit that was emerging there and elsewhere throughout the modern world. That spirit was manifested initially,
for James, in his own body and mind. For if the inherited philosophy had tended toward the
abstract and impersonal, toward the idealistic and systematic, his own inclinations gravitated
from the start toward the concrete and personal, the realistic and indeterminate. Not rational
conceptions but emotional feelings, not static absolutes but shifting relations, not theoretical
conclusions but practical inquiries fed his inner life and prompted his intellectual work.
In the final decade of his life, James wrote about the temperamental foundations of philosophical reflection. In doing so, he had to look no further than his own experience to illustrate his point. His distinctive philosophy, he observed, was “only partly got from books.”
More directly, it came from his own individual way of “seeing and feeling the total push and
pressure of the cosmos” (P: 9). This mode of comprehending reality was significant because
it resonated with the experience of untold others. So, when Santayana emphasized James’s
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“personal spontaneity” and “personal vitality” rather than, say, his unusually creative intellect or
his wide range of knowledge as the sources of his tradition-breaking impact upon philosophy,
he was simply echoing James’s own conviction about the psychological roots of his philosophical thought. And beyond Santayana’s and James’s shared belief in the relevance of James’s temperament and personal experiences to his philosophy, not to mention his psychology, others
who knew James well (Perry 1935) held similar beliefs, as have scholarly commentators right up
to our own time. The philosopher Owen Flanagan, for instance, has testified that James is his
favorite philosopher because he is
the best example I know of a person doing philosophy; there is no hiding the person
behind the work, no way of discussing the work without the person, no way to make
believe that there is a way to do philosophy that is not personal.
(Flanagan 1997: 47)
The example that James provides for Flanagan (and for many others) is that of a philosopher
who is “absorbed” and even “obsessed” by problems of a deeply personal nature (47). In short,
philosophy for James was a deeply personal enterprise. And as Ludwig Wittgenstein put it,
James’s philosophy matters because it comes from “a real human being,” a full person and not just
an agile intellect (Monk 1990: 478).
But how exactly did James’s personal characteristics, experiences, and concerns impact upon
his philosophy?1 To answer that question we will need to look further back, well before he
started publishing the works for which he is best known within philosophy: before, that is, Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe (1909), The Meaning of Truth (1909), and the posthumously
collected Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912). Before and behind these works was the work
that Santayana (among many others) called James’s greatest achievement (Santayana 1920/2009:
585); namely, his monumental Principles of Psychology (1890).2 So the questions we need to ask
are: (1) What were the personal characteristics, experiences, and concerns – the personal psychology – that shaped James’s thought? (2) How was this personal psychology manifested in his
professional psychology? and (3) How was his philosophy rooted in his psychology, both personal
and professional? We will find that these questions are stated too simply, since the formation
of James’s philosophical views was under way from the very beginning. But with appropriate
qualifications along the way, this division of labor and progression – from the personal context
of James’s life to the development of his psychology and thence to the articulation of his philosophy – will provide an effective means of elucidating the personal nature of James’s thought.

1. Personal context
James’s choice of topics, the way he handled those topics, his use of personal examples, his
unusually penetrating perceptions, his antipathy to unwarranted precision, and his wariness
regarding linguistic conventions can all be seen as expressions of deeply rooted personal qualities and experience. Interestingly, though he was remembered most frequently by students and
colleagues for his exceptional “vigor” and “manly” characteristics – the same personal spontaneity and vitality that Santayana underscored – those characteristics were not prominent during
James’s crucially formative decades leading up to the publication of The Principles of Psychology in
1890.3 To the contrary, during much of that period, James manifested a distinctly non-vigorous,
even “unmanly” set of characteristics, marked by hypersensitivity and inability to decide and act.
The hypersensitivity took the form of neurasthenia and melancholy, with associated physical
ailments (tiredness, poor eyesight, insomnia, digestive disorders, fevers, etc.) that often seemed
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to be psychosomatic in nature and were almost certainly magnified by hypochondriacal worries. James’s related inability to decide and to act led to protracted periods of unproductive and
emotion-laden idleness from which he sought escape.4
These traits – the hypersensitivity and inactivity – constituted important aspects of the personal context surrounding James’s creative work on the emerging science of psychology. They
were traits that he worked against in both his life and work. His often debilitating experiences
explain why, even though he was later seen as “an irresistible gust of life coming down the
street” (Brown 1948: 47–48), those who knew him best were always mindful that he had undergone the equivalent of psychological death and resurrection. And even after his resurrection,
there remained, as one friend put it, a note of “sadness” behind his typical “playfulness,” the
same sort of melancholic reflectiveness exhibited by other “sensitive people” who desire to be
“agents of truth and happiness” in a world that often frustrates their attainment (Chapman 1996:
56). In short, James was “twice-born,” as he later described individuals with similar experiences.
Though able for the most part to live in a more “healthy-minded” way in the decades after he
recovered from his darkest and most dysfunctional period, he never lost his consciousness of
having been a “sick soul.”5
In retrospect, James’s “dark period” can be seen as beginning with occasional breakdowns
in the early 1860s, but it wasn’t until 1866 that the symptoms he experienced reached a critical
level of intensity, with graver and more sustained manifestations. These debilitating manifestations persisted thereafter, with brief respites, until mid-1878, when he married Alice Howe Gibbens. After that time, his symptoms became less severe and more intermittent, and they faded
even more (without ever completely disappearing) after 1884, when he published an important
draft of his major psychological ideas.6 It was during this extended period of “unmanliness” that
James developed the crucial insights that undergirded his innovative version of psychology. The
darkness had obviously stirred his psychologically relevant concerns, interests, and aversions.
Clearly, discovering how to comprehend and cope with his hypersensitivity and his inability to
decide and act – how to understand his state of mind and return to his more temperamentally
characteristic, active way of being – contributed directly and significantly to the development
of his psychology.7
The underlying problems during James’s dark period revolved around his difficulties dealing
with “the moral business,” as he called it: the business of determining whether or not human
beings, particularly himself, were (or can be) active, individual agents capable of making a personal difference in ameliorating the world’s shortcomings. This concern was foreshadowed by
his assertion in 1858, at the age of 16, that it “ought to be everyone’s object in life” to be of
“as much use as possible.” Indeed, he asked a childhood friend, “which of us would wish to go
through life without leaving a trace”? “We must all lead an active life and live for others, not
for ourselves. You and I must fight . . . for the common good” (C4: 11–13). Ten years later,
in the midst of his dark period, James feared that his earlier belief in individual agency and his
related hope to make a difference in the grander scheme of things were chimeras. The specter of
materialistic determinism associated with scientific understanding paralyzed him, even prompting thoughts of suicide. If he wasn’t able to make a “nick, however small” in human history,
and thereby assert his “reality,” he could see no reason to live and no way to escape his resulting
depression and inaction. What would be the point of it all if “the thought of my having a will,”
which is to say, individual agency, were utterly delusional? (C4: 248–50).
In the months and years immediately following these comments, James worked his way,
slowly and painfully, through severe doubts about the existence of personal agency. As he did so,
his distinctive psychological inclinations came to the fore in direct reaction against the forces that
oppressed and depressed him. Those forces were revealed all too starkly in his diary. Just four
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months after expressing his desire to assert his own agency, for instance, he was complaining
about “the dead drifting of my own life” and about the “horror of waste[d] life.” He yearned,
he said, for “an end to the idle, idiotic sinking into Vorstellungen disproportionate to the object”
– in other words, the kind of unproductive, unrealistic, and excessively protracted thoughts that
filled his days. Instead, he wrote, he needed to “keep sinewy” and cling to his belief in “humanity” ( James 1868–1873: May 22, 1868). By July of 1868, frustration regarding his continuing
failure to do so led him to record the following thoughts in French: “So, you want to die,
because in you there are so many things that lead to nothing and that are merely disgusting? So
die!” ( July 22, 1868, my translation). Seven months later nothing had changed; his difficulty,
he wrote, continued to be how “to act without hope” (February 1869). Almost a year later, he
admitted that he was still unable to “study, make, or enjoy” anything (December 21, 1869). And
then came a pivotal moment, a “great dorsal collapse” in which he “about touched bottom”
and realized, at last, that
I must face the choice with open eyes: shall I frankly throw the moral business [of
believing and acting as an independent agent] overboard, as one unsuited to my innate
aptitudes, or shall I follow it, and it alone. . . ? – I will give the latter alternative a fair
trial. . . . Hitherto I have . . . deceived myself. . . . I was cultivating the moral int[erest]
only as a means, & more or less humbugging my self. Now I must regard these useful
ends only as occasions for my moral life to become active.
(February 1, 1870)
This important moment was followed by a decisive if still not final step. Inspired by Charles
Renouvier’s voluntaristic philosophy, James resolved that “my first act of free will shall be to
believe in free will.” Putting a stop to his obsessively introspective musings, he would now “voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom.” He would act as if he were free and observe the
results. If they were good, if his depression and inaction became things of the past, he might
one day be able to “return to metaphysic study & skepticism without danger to my powers
of action.” But he needed to keep in mind that “only when habits of order are formed can
we advance to really interesting fields of action.” For “not in maxims, not in Anschauungen
[opinions], but in accumulated acts of thought lies salvation.” Rather than seeing “suicide” as
“the most manly form to put my daring into,” as he had before, he would now believe “in my
individual reality and creative power,” positing “life, (the real, the good) in the self governing
resistance of the ego to the world” (April 30, 1870). James’s resolution to resist, to push back, to
stand up and act on his own was effective on a personal level only on and off over the next seven
years, but it characterized his personality over the later years of his life as it had during his earlier
ones. And, crucially, the positive, active, consequential attitudes represented by his pushing back
against the pressures of the cosmos came to characterize his psychology, which he developed in
the years following his declaration of personal freedom.

2. Psychological thought
What forms did James’s psychology take, and how did it reflect the hypersensitivity, desire for
personal agency, and loathing of inaction that typified James’s dark period? First, his persistent
introspection made him an especially acute observer of consciousness in all its subtle variations.
This stood him well as he began to explore the intricacies of consciousness and the interactive dynamics of thinking, feeling, willing, and acting. In particular, his astute observations
uncovered the simplification and surprisingly non-empirical nature of then-current empirical
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psychology. Consciousness is not composed of preexisting, separate parts (“ideas”) that are conjoined post hoc through the mechanical operation of universal laws of association, as empiricists
claimed; rather, James pointed out, it arrives already all together in our experience. It is only
subsequently, as each mind parses the continual flow of consciousness, that certain parts are
abstracted, identified, and emphasized according to that mind’s individual interests, active attention, and selective discrimination. This fundamental realization of the initial togetherness of
consciousness led James to give a devastating critique of passive associationism as early as 1878
(EPh: 7–22) and to propose, in 1879, a preliminary draft of his own contrasting portrait of
consciousness, not only as unified in the first instance but as active, selective, and individuating
over time (EPh: 32–64).8
This distinctly Jamesian view of the mind was apparent almost from the start of James’s
work in psychology, long before its culmination in his Principles of Psychology (1890). In an early
review of contemporary psychology, for instance, James asserted – again against the tide – that
“my experience is only what I agree to attend to.” More concretely, it is “only by selective
attention and recognition” that the chaotic “mass of impressions” in consciousness becomes
“orderly,” regulated according to the “interests” of the individual’s “emotional constitution”
(ECR: 300). And this mental regulation shows, James inferred, that once consciousness is
“superadded to life,” it serves as a “substitute for [biological] mechanism” (ECR: 303). It makes
a difference, effecting real change, which emanates from within rather than without. As James
put it in an article two and a half years later: “There belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a
spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, not a mere looker-on” (EPh: 21). His entire psychology
was premised on this activist view of mind, central to which was his famous analysis of willing
as the result – or more precisely, the equivalent – of directing one’s attention to one particular
action-precipitating idea over another. Any dominant idea, held in the center of consciousness,
is naturally propulsive, or impulsive as James put it. Using this conviction as a basic postulate, he
worked out his theory of the will in two articles, one published in 1880 and the other in 1888,
before writing his classic chapter for Principles (EPs: 83–124; EPs: 216–34; PP: ch. 26).9
James’s treatment of consciousness offered other innovative insights, similarly based upon his
unusually perceptive observations, such as his well-known differentiation of substantive versus
transitive aspects of mental dynamics. The former are the more solid or enduring aspects of
consciousness – sensations, images, percepts, and concepts – while the latter are the more fleeting, typically evanescent relations between them. Having evaded description and discussion by
earlier psychologists, these “feelings of relation,” as James called them, were shown by him to be
extremely important in the establishment of meaning (PP: 236–62). They are also a significant
means by which emotional factors, rooted in biology, have their tangible but often overlooked
sway in mental life. Though sometimes substantive, emotion-related phenomena are frequently
transitive in nature, but in either case they motivate and orient a person’s thoughts, feelings,
and behavior.
In “The Sentiment of Rationality” (EPh: 32–64), at once a psychological and philosophical article, James made it clear – as he knew so well from his long bout with depression – that
thoughts are always invested with emotional significance, just as emotions have varying degrees
of cognitive import.10 It should not be surprising, therefore, that intellectual inquiry tends to
address emotionally relevant topics, while the suspension of intellectual inquiry typically occurs
when a feeling of emotional ease is attained. In fact, thoughts and feelings are so intertwined
in experience that James later refused to posit any definitive distinction between them (PP:
185–86). Humans depend upon both in their pursuit of a proactive life.11
Although James valued an active life and was always open to new experiences in our everchanging world, he also knew the value of relative stability. He had indicated this when he
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observed, in the midst of his darkest days, that it is “only when habits of order are formed” that
we can “advance to really interesting fields of action” ( James 1868–1873: April 30, 1870). What
he meant, and what he conveyed more explicitly in his later chapter on habit, is that to achieve
anything worthwhile, one needs to establish relevant habits of both thought and action. Habit,
in short, is the crucial counterbalance to freedom. Without it, there would be excessive randomness and contingency, a continual need to decide and assert one’s will. By routinizing basic
aspects of life, one’s consciousness is able to attend to novel challenges rather than be distracted
by every passing stimulus or situation. The establishment of good habits, James believed, thus
transforms what would be a virtual chaos into productive order. As he put it in The Principles of
Psychology: “The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody
of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work.”
Then, speaking from personal experience, he asserted that
there is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but
indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the
time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are
subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the
deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically
not to exist for his consciousness at all. If there be such daily duties not yet ingrained
in any one of my readers, let him begin this very hour to set the matter right.
(PP: 126–27)
In the same chapter he also admonished his readers to be sure to “discharge” any emotional
arousal by allowing it to spur action of some kind, for “there is no more contemptible type of
human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a
weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed” (PP: 129).
This too was a hard-won lesson from his own life, which had led him to pursue – and encourage – active rather than passive living.
Finally, James’s psychology incorporated not only an activist view of mind, a related emphasis
upon will, a special place for emotions (though not a passive soaking in them), and an acknowledgment of the importance of habit, but it also foregrounded the centrality of the self. In fact,
James claimed that “the personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate
datum in psychology,” for “the universal conscious fact is not ‘feeling and thought arise,’ but
‘I think’ and ‘I feel’” (PP: 221). This self-consciousness is fundamental not just to psychology
but also to life and to all of reality as we experience it. Our personal selves are at the core of
experience, inextricably bound to our bodies and to the world around us (including especially
significant others). In a famous formulation, James divided the self, conceptually, into three
intertwined aspects, designated as the bodily, the social, and the spiritual (PP: 279–88). His
explication of each aspect drew upon his own introspective experience, as did his discussion of
alternative selves and of those dimensions of the self that extend beyond the margins of typical
consciousness (PP: 352–78). He was, after all, intimately familiar with the relation between
physical conditions, on the one hand, and mental states, on the other. Who we are depends, as
he knew, upon our physiological constitution as well as the way others see and treat us – and
how we value or dismiss their attention (PP: 281–83). Our deepest sense of self is far from ethereal; it is tied not to thoughts but to our bodies – to such subtle yet tangible experiences as the
“peculiar motions” that we feel within ourselves as we think, whether “in the head” or somewhere “between the head and heart” (PP: 288), and to the feelings of “warmth and intimacy”
that pervade our own thoughts as opposed to the thoughts and feelings expressed by of others
40

The psychological roots of James’s thought

(PP: 314). James himself, after closely monitoring his own self-consciousness, reported that “the
opening and closing of the glottis” and “the movements of the muscles of the brow and eyelids”
always accompanied his own thinking (PP: 288). Such sensations supplemented the feelings of
warmth and intimacy that were more than sufficient, in his estimation, to account for the sense
of personal identity (PP: 316–18).
In claiming that “the central part of the me” – of the self as known – is literally “the feeling of
the body” (PP: 351), James anticipated by a full century our contemporary emphasis upon the
embodiment of the self. Similarly, his discussion of other possible selves (PP: 300–301) augured
recent psychological and philosophical explorations; and here again, his sensitivity and insights
were triggered by his own experience, this time regarding what he called his “murdered” self –
the possible artistic self that he rejected and set aside in lieu of his scientific and philosophical
ambitions.12 As he put it in Principles, one might wish to be (and even be capable of entertaining) a variety of contradictory selves, but such alternatives “could not well keep house in the
same tenement of clay,” since “to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be
suppressed” (PP: 295). One might argue the point, but the argument would be made in terms
that James provided, based on firsthand knowledge.

3. Philosophical thought
The sense of possibility – of authentically alternative selves, conceptions, and future realities –
was a central feature of James’s philosophical worldview. His advocacy of possibility was rooted
in his personal struggle with “the moral business” discussed above. An important early expression of his concern can be found in his 1884 article on “The Dilemma of Determinism”
(reprinted in WB: 114–40). Though offered as a criticism of unbending belief in scientific
determinism, this article presaged his later criticism of idealistic monism. Both, he felt, presented a picture of a “block-universe,” as he later called it (PU: 147): a universe in which everything has its inevitable, predetermined, unchanging, and unchangeable place. If everything
happens due to an unavoidable cause or ineluctable reason, he pointed out, then there are no
“real, genuine possibilities in the world” (WB: 135). Everything is and always will be as it must
be. As we have seen, he found this conclusion morally repugnant. So he cast his lot, primarily
for this personal reason, on the side of “indeterminism,” even as he admitted that “from any
strict theoretical point of view, the question [of determinism] is insoluble” (WB: 24). But if so,
why should anyone accept the determinist conclusion that leads to pessimism rather than the
indeterminist alternative that allows optimism, however guarded, regarding “the chance that in
moral respects the future may be other and better than the past has been”? (WB: 137). It is only
the existence of possibility, he argued, that “gives the palpitating reality to our moral life and
makes it tingle” (WB: 140). If nothing can be changed, if everything is as it must be, then any
feelings of regret – any disapproval we may feel regarding senseless murders, horrific tragedies,
and terrible social conditions – are inexplicable and irrational (WB: 126). Why and how should
one regret or even imagine an alternative to what could not have been otherwise? So he opted
to accept evidence that the world is, “to a great extent, plastic” (WB: 115), which led him to
conclude that we live in “a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can
ever take in the whole scene,” since novel decisions and unexpected events may occur at any
time, inside or outside the purview of any particular observer (WB: 136).
Much of James’s mature philosophy is drawn from beliefs and conclusions like these, which
empower hope over resignation (VRE: 414) and imply that “things” are always and everywhere
“in the making” (PU: 117). The dynamic, morally sensitive, non-dogmatic, and practically
oriented aspects of his philosophy are among the major reasons that his thought has remained
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as relevant and popular as it has. As suggested here, his emphasis on these aspects came from,
and satisfied, his own temperamental inclinations, his personal craving for free will and for the
related ability of individuals to make a difference, and conversely, from his personal experience
of anxiety and depression when he didn’t believe in these things. As he put it, he simply felt
more “at home” in the open-ended world that he had come to accept and describe.13 Of course,
others with different temperamental inclinations, including many philosophers, have preferred
more order, rules, and bureaucracy than James, who always took the side of individual freedom
over social organization.14 He delighted in novelty, surprises, and even the suspense entailed in
the unfolding of what he called “dramatic” possibilities and probabilities.15
The sense of possibility and probability is a psychological phenomenon, as James well knew
and as he emphasized in his own psychology, in which he insisted that “the mind is at every
stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities” – of different sensations, perceptions, and conceptions – among which the mind selects and suppresses “by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency
of attention” (PP: 277).16 He illustrated his point with a metaphor drawn from the arts, saying
that the mind
works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone. . . .
Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! . . . My world is but one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract them.
(PP: 277)
Even as he was just beginning to elaborate his views on the selective nature of consciousness, James was already applying it to philosophy, which he defined in 1876 as “the habit of
always seeing an alternative, of not taking the usual for granted, of making conventionalities
fluid again, of imagining foreign states of mind.” In short, he said, philosophy is and depends
upon “the possession of mental perspective” (EPh: 4). James held on to this view to the end
of his life, when he argued that philosophy “is able to fancy everything different from what it
is,” thus seeing “the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar” (SPP:
11). Philosophizing in this way entails not only noticing previously overlooked sensations and
perceptions, including ( James hoped) sensations and perceptions of the kind his expanded form
of empiricism acknowledged, but also conceptualizing and adjudicating alternative concepts in
innovative ways. It depends, in other words, upon the psychological ability to see and understand things in new ways and the philosophical commitment to evaluate these alternative ways
in relation to appropriately unfettered experience. Two key aspects of James’s mature philosophy
were essential manifestations of his distinctive approach: (1) the radical empiricism that served
as his ideal means of gathering the sensational and perceptual foundations of philosophy and (2)
the pragmatism that represented his ideal means of weighing both old and new concepts.
James’s radical empiricism was a scrupulous, thoroughgoing expansion of traditional empiricism. It refused to omit and explicitly valued anything and everything that occurs in experience,
including subjective states, properties, and qualities of mind that had been typically overlooked and
often devalued in the past, especially by scientific positivists. In 1897 he described his approach
as treating all facts of experience as “hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future
experience” (WB: 5). This accorded with his psychological conviction that the perception of facts
is always perspectival and hence always liable to change, which led him to align his radical empiricism with pluralism. Pulling together much of what we have reviewed above, he argued that
there is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single
fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real
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crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life . . . may remain in
empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to “overcome” or to reinterpret in monistic form [either materialistically or rationalistically].
(WB: 6–7)
Such conceptions are simply hypotheses awaiting confirmation or disconfirmation in the course
of further experience. Anticipating his later discussions of pragmatism, he argued that the “truest” religious hypothesis, like the “truest” scientific hypothesis, is “that which, as we say, ‘works’
best” in relation to the rest of our experience (WB: 8), always understanding that what works
best now may not work best in the future. As he said on a number of occasions, “ever not quite”
is the appropriate byword (EPh: 189–90; WB: 6; P: 258). As for the constitution of experience,
it is important to note that it includes, for James, all our concepts, beliefs, values, needs, and
emotions as well as our sensations and perceptions (see Leary 2018: ch. 13).
What made James’s empiricism even more radical was its insistence upon the dignity, so
to say, of all facts, however small or seemingly trivial. The emotion one feels in looking at a
painting is, in James’s view, just as real and possibly even more consequential than the painting
itself. Looking back to psychology, feelings of transition in the stream of consciousness are just
as notable (if not as noticeable) as the more substantive thoughts within that stream. No a priori
rules, past experiences, or inherited conceptual structures can predetermine the significance
of any fact. What may seem significant from a particular point of view or within a particular
context may be irrelevant in another. And going beyond mere epistemology, all the pragmatic
questioning of conceptual frameworks and conclusions that follows from radical empiricism
led James, in 1904, to hypothesize a distinctive kind of neutral monism, a metaphysical belief
that from the ongoing flow of experience different individuals will abstract different “things,”
including “minds” and “bodies,” some of which are experienced as “mine” and some of which
are attributed to “others” (ERE: 3–19, 21–44). The distinction of mind from body, however,
is simply tactical or instrumental since there is no experiential warrant for positing any essential
separation between them. This was a radical claim then as now.
The pragmatic weighing of concepts, as first formally proclaimed by James in 1898 (reprinted
in P: 257–70), was a direct result of, and totally dependent upon, the psychological function of
cognition, as James had spelled it out in 1885 (reprinted in MT: 13–32). Even earlier, in 1878,
he had written that
the knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively
reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an
actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the
truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they
are bases for human action – action which to a great extent transforms the world –
help to make the truth which they declare.
(EPh: 21)
Twelve years later, in The Principles of Psychology, he summarized the point by saying that “the
pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are . . . the mark and
criterion of the presence of mentality” (PP: 21). Concepts, for James, are among our chief
means for the attainment of goals, which include both adequate comprehension and appropriate action. Some concepts will prove, with experience, to be more adequate just as some
actions will prove to be more appropriate. When they do, their greater utility should lead us
to prefer them to extant alternatives. This is the basic and simple core of pragmatism, of the
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very practical approach that James proposed for establishing the relative worth of our ideas and
actions. Indeed, he felt that this is what we do naturally, if not typically with fully conscious
intention. It is the feedback that we receive from using our ideas that provides our best assurance of their value.
This approach to testing concepts, definitions, intuitions, and related behaviors against further
experience, noting how well they work in comparison with alternative possibilities, was to be a
hallmark of James’s later philosophy.17 It did not promise the truth or perfect outcomes, but it produced sufficient empirical evidence that a particular cognition or action was warranted, at least in
a particular context and at a particular time. In this way it suited James’s radical empiricism, with
its assumption that new facts, or new ways of seeing facts, can arise at any time, and that there
are multiple ways of conceptualizing and acting, some better for one purpose but possibly not for
others. James’s emphasis upon the relative utility of ideas underscored his belief that the mind has
evolved to serve very specific purposes in the lives of organisms that possess mentality. It fit his
Darwinian view of nature without conceding, as Tennyson did, that such a view entailed being
“red in tooth and claw” (Tennyson 1850/1989: 399). Human interests, James insisted, extend
well beyond any reductive struggle for survival (PP: 313). Selecting appropriately among ethical
options, among different ways of comprehending and responding to the human situation, was
crucial for James. Transforming the world for the good was and still remains an option that interests many individuals. Indeed, as we have seen, it was James’s own original interest, his sustained
hope, and the personal goal that his psychology and philosophy were meant to serve.

4. Final thoughts
When we acknowledge that James’s philosophical thought is rooted in his personal as well as
professional psychology, are we thereby reducing his philosophical thought to a form of subjectivism? Do his philosophical views represent simply what he had or wanted or wished to believe?
No! James always insisted upon openness to whatever might be possible, whether or not it accords
with what we are inclined to believe, and this radical openness, he argued, should always be
accompanied by a search for verification. Even here, however, we need to acknowledge James’s
distinctly psychological understanding of verification. What do we take to be true? to be warranted? to be worthy of our belief ? to be a sufficiently firm basis for our action? Not only what
may have empirical evidence in its favor, though such evidence should be sought, carefully considered, and never ignored. But since different opinions – even different explanations – sometimes
have comparable empirical support, we often need to use additional means to separate the
wheat from the chaff. In this situation, James wrote:
That theory will be most generally believed [and should be most generally believed]
which, besides offering us objects able to account satisfactorily for our sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting, those which appeal most urgently to
our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.
(PP: 940)
We are, in short, creatures who try to maximize the satisfaction of our various needs, not
all of which are narrowly cognitive in nature. Some explanations and descriptions are more
elegant than others, some more pleasing, some more consistent with what we already know,
more consonant with our hopes and ideals, and more relevant to our practical concerns. We
may like simplicity, when it can be had, but we also want our simple descriptions and explanations to account for as rich a diversity of facts as possible (EPh: 35–41). But even here, we see
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temperamental differences in emphasis, as the rationalists among us settle more readily for a
“skinny outline” while the empiricists show more interest in “the rich thicket of reality.” Ultimately, the issue is not what pleases but what works for us, what helps us get from one situation
to another in a way that is “progressive, harmonious, satisfactory” (P: 38–39, 97).
This psychologically grounded approach to verification – to the warranted acceptance, however temporary, of what fulfills our aesthetic, emotional, and practical needs in addition to more
purely cognitive requirements – will not satisfy those who are committed to “the quest for
certainty,” which John Dewey (1929) saw as a hallmark of past philosophical rumination. But it
will appeal to and provide a supportive and corrective framework for those who live and think
and act, like James, in vibrant awareness of the ever-ongoing and ever-changing experience of
modern life, replete as it is with unanticipated surprises and possibilities.18 To live and think and
act in this moment – in our own time and place – is what concerned James. His determination
to do so, to the best of his ability, was at the center of his personal and professional life, and this
might well be the best way to conceive his legacy to us. The genteel tradition of old, we might
say, has given way to a more genuine tradition of today, characterized by a commitment to being
both personally and professionally honest. Such honesty has its limits, its own forms of fallibility,
as all things do, but James would have us live, as he did, within those limits, with as much integrity as we can, always aware, as he put it, that “you can’t weed out the human contribution” to
all that we experience, believe, and do (P: 122).19

Notes
1 Since James explicitly stated that “temperament” is “to a great extent” responsible for one’s philosophical orientation (P: 11), my focus here on personal characteristics, experiences, and concerns rather than
temperament per se needs to be explained and defended. I provide that explanation and defense in
“William James’s Use of Temperaments and Types” (Leary 2021). The key point is that, for James, personal characteristics, experiences, and concerns were the practical equivalent or result of temperament,
whereas temperament as a theoretical concept, in his time, lacked the kind of physiological, neurological,
or genetic substantiation or stipulation to which it seemed to refer. In short, no one knew exactly which
biological factors were associated with which psychological characteristics, though some (including
James) assumed that there were intimate connections between and among them.
2 Other major works by James included the psychological Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and the
philosophical Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897) as well as the incomplete,
posthumously published Some Problems of Philosophy (1911).
3 James’s vigor and manliness were highlighted by many of his students, colleagues, and friends as well as
family members. His student Gertrude Stein, for instance, wrote that James was “truly a man among
men” whose “strong sane personality” was both gentle and balanced (Miller 1949: 146–47). Lest this
seem the mere gushing of an enthralled student, the same point was made by such ultra-sober and
long-acquainted colleagues as George Herbert Palmer and George H. Howison. Palmer, for instance,
averred that when James’s “alert figure comes to mind . . . there always comes with it the adjective
“manly.” In every tense fibre of his being James was a man” (Palmer 1996: 30). Howison went even
further, asserting that James’s “unaffected manly vigor has hardly been surpassed, perhaps not even
equaled” (Howison 1916: 241). These last two posthumous testaments were all the more remarkable
given James’s physically weakened, sometimes incapacitating condition over the final twelve years of
his life, which suggests – as we shall see – that James’s “manliness” was something other than the mere
physical vitality associated with this heavily gendered term. Townsend (1996) has discussed the ideal of
“manhood” at Harvard in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, paying particular attention
to James. Lears (1981: ch. 3) has discussed the related “martial ideal” of the time, also referring to James.
4 The difficulties that James experienced in his twenties and thirties have been well documented by Allen
(1967), Croce (2018), Feinstein (1984), Richardson (2006), Simon (1998), and others. My own discussions of his difficulties include Leary (2013: 177–84), Leary (2015a), and Leary (2015b). The latter two
articles include previously unknown information about the roles played by Arthur Schopenhauer and
John Bunyan in the onset and resolution of James’s primary period of personal crisis.
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5 See The Varieties of Religious Experience for the origin and fuller meaning of these terms, which are used
here in a secular rather than religious sense (VRE: 4–7).
6 By the time he published this draft, “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology” (EPs: 142–67),
James had already published eight other articles that, together with “Omissions,” formed a very sturdy
foundation for his Principles of Psychology.
7 Although James’s later “manliness” might be seen as a form of reaction formation or compensation for
his drawn-out period of hypersensitivity and relative inactivity (characteristics considered “unmanly” in
the gendered terminology of that time, by James and most others), in fact it represented a return to his
earlier personality, captured by his brother Henry’s description of him as “always round the corner and
out of sight” and his sister Alice’s comparison of him to a “blob of mercury” upon which you couldn’t
keep “a mental finger” (H. James 1913/1983: 8; A. James 1889–1892/1999: 57).
8 The classic expression of James’s views on consciousness (PP: ch. 9) builds directly upon these earlier
accounts.
9 In his first article on the will, James asserted explicitly that “to sustain a representation [or idea], to think,
is what requires the effort, and is the true moral act” (EPs: 113). The conscious initiation of an action
always involves a choice, making it a moral act. As he said in two prominent places, “Will you or won’t
you have it so?” is “the most probing question we are ever asked” (PP: 1182; BC: 394).
10 This 1879 article prefigured his later argument about the temperamental basis of philosophical reflection (PU: ch. 1), as did an 1884 article in which he argued that the “divining power” of philosophers
depends upon “all our faculties, emotional as well as logical” (reprinted in ERE: 137–43).
11 For an analysis and discussion of James’s intertwined treatment of cognition and emotion, see Leary
(2018: ch. 9) This book also treats other interconnections in James’s Principles of Psychology, e.g.,
between mind and brain, habit and thought, perception and conception, imagination and memory,
consciousness and unconsciousness, attention and will, and self and others.
12 James introduced the concept of a “murdered” self in an 1880 article (reprinted in WB: 163–89, 171).
Feinstein (1884: ch. 8) elucidates the context of James’s turn away from an early interest in art, interestingly in 1861, around the time James’s unhealthy symptoms began to manifest themselves. In fact, Feinstein concludes that James’s “painterly self, the alternative ego that he stifled, did not fade away. Instead
it insistently reappeared through symptoms that plagued him for the remainder of his life” (Feinstein
1884: 145). I have traced James’s later emphasis upon sensation, perception, and perspective, including
importantly his appreciation for the role of alternative perspectives, to his experience as an apprentice
painter (Leary 1992). In turning from art, James was following the dictates of his father, which also
played a role in his decision not to enroll in the Union Army in 1862, another source of inner conflict,
which left him feeling “very small and shabby” (C4: 82).
13 James recognized that the sense of homesickness is a deterrent to human flourishing (PP: 941). Feeling at home – reasonably comfortable with the world in which we live – was important to James, who
felt that humans have a natural desire to live in an environment in which their “powers” seem to be “a
match” for its perceived “demands” (WB: 108). “We crave alike to feel more truly at home with it [the
universe], and to contribute our mite to its amelioration” (PU: 11). The moral basis of his acceptance of
free will and hence of all that follows from it is clearly indicated in his chapter on “Will” in The Principles
of Psychology. Admitting that “the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds,” he
explicitly stated that the grounds of his opinion were “ethical rather than psychological” (PP: 1176).
14 James often spoke of the “wildness” of nature, and contrasted his own view of it to that of his colleague
Hugo Münsterberg, to whom he wrote in 1906, saying that “I am satisfied with a free wild Nature;
you seem to me to cherish and pursue an Italian Garden, where all things are kept in separate compartments, and one must follow straight-ruled walks” (C11: 241). Still, he insisted on his “fixed belief ”
that “the world is wide enough to sustain and nourish without harm many different types of thinking,”
thereby illustrating his pluralistic contention that the world can be understood and dealt with in a
variety of ways. As he put it in a lecture a few years earlier, “I want a world of anarchy, M. [Münsterberg] one of bureaucracy, and each appeals to “Nature” to back him up. Nature partly helps & resists
each of us” (ML: 326). His insistent focus on individuality and the pluralistic views associated with it
was fully apparent in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (TT: 132–49); his leaning toward
anarchism (maximum freedom barring harm to others) in politics and social life has been convincingly
documented by Cotkin (1990) and Coon (1996); and his acceptance of antinomianism in ethics (Marchetti 2015) was perhaps best expressed by his acceptance of the Augustinian imperative, to love and do
what you will (VRE: 72). In short, James put the onus of responsibility – of decision-making – on the
individual. Anticipating situational ethics, he felt that each person must determine what actions best
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accord, in the here and now, with love and concern for the world and others in it. A key element of his
moral thought is that it starts with profound respect for the individual – every individual (TT: 132–49).
It is how one sees and values others as well as the world that leads to moral action (Leary 2009). Rondel
(2017) has given a succinct reading of James’s “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” (reprinted
in WB: 141–62), contrasting James’s moral thought to the two dominant ethical traditions of the past
two centuries.
This notion of “dramatic” possibility, probability, and reality was a favorite and telling metaphor for
James. It is both conceptually and methodologically related to the recent development of narrative
psychology (as I have argued in Leary 2018: 328–31). It appears in a wide variety of his works (WB:
131; VRE: 390–92; EPR: 283–85, 361–73; MT: 49). His own sense of dramatic probabilities, James
suggested, came from “the whole drift of my education,” which is to say, from all of his prior experience (VRE: 408). He allowed that others have different experiences and hence different expectations
about what is likely to occur. None of us can live very effectively without expectations of what lies
ahead, though we can never rule out unexpected occurrences. “The world is full of partial stories that
run parallel to one another,” he wrote in Pragmatism. “Whoever says that the whole world tells one
story utters another of those monistic dogmas that a man believes at his risk” (P: 70–71).
According to James, the senses select from among many possible sensations in the ambient environment;
some of those sensations are then selected for perception; some of the resulting perceptions are selected
for conceptualization; some of those conceptions are selected as more aesthetically, morally, or practically
attractive than the others; and of the remaining conceptions some draw attention, hence selection, by the
will. In short, selection occurs all the way up the hierarchy of psychological functions (PP: 273–77).
James’s pragmatism is articulated most fully in Pragmatism (1907) and The Meaning of Truth (1909), but
it was illustrated throughout his writings (see esp. WB and VRE).
Of course, no single person can perceive every fact, surprise, or possibility. James was deeply aware that
each of us depends upon the observations, conjectures, and verifications of others (WB: 87). We are
continually exchanging truths (P: 100).
To sum up: when James insisted that any given philosophy can provide only a “summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, and foreshortened bird’s-eye view of the perspective of events” (PU:
9), he was acknowledging that philosophy is necessarily partial, perspectival, personal, and definitely
not “a view from nowhere,” to steal Thomas Nagel’s (1986) useful terminology.
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